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Abstract 
In this article I present a critical reconstruction of the concept of postfordism, arguing for 
a regulation-theoretic approach that views Fordism and postfordism not in terms of 
production models based on a particular labor process but as institutional regimes of 
competition, within which there are one of four types of generic labor process: high 
autonomy, semiautonomous, tightly-constrained and unrationalized labor-intensive. I 
show that over one-third of US employment is in low-autonomy jobs and sketch an 
analytical framework for analyzing job quality. Contrasting the four labor process types 
with various measures of job quality produces 18 job types that reduce to one of three job 
quality categories: good jobs, bad jobs and decent jobs. The typology provides a 
framework for analyzing upgrading or downgrading of four aspects of employment 
quality within and across the four generic labor processes.  
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Introduction 
Income inequality in the United States declined from 1947 to the early 1970s, after which 
it began a continuous rise through to the present. The former period was characterized by 
strong growth in and convergence of family incomes, the latter by slow growth and 
divergence (Goldin and Katz, 2008). The standard economic explanation for rising 
inequality – skill-biased technical change – posits that demand for high-skilled workers 
has outpaced supply (see especially the extensive empirical analyses and debate between 
Card and DiNardo (2002) and Autor et al. (2008)). Within the same supply-and-demand 
model, Goldin and Katz (2008) emphasize the supply side, arguing that technical change 
over the 20th century has been continuous, but educational attainment began a long-term 
slowdown in the 1970s. While supply and technologically-driven demand are certainly an 
important part of the story on rising inequality, these economic arguments provide little 
explanatory leverage on wage variations within specific occupations (and are silent on 
other measures of job quality). Part of the reason is that such explanations abstract from 
the culturally- and politically-shaped, context-dependent decision-making processes of 
real managers in real organizations. Additionally, mainstream economic explanations 
elide a fundamental underlying problem: structural demand for low-autonomy jobs 
arising from the profit-driven social division of labor.  
By 2005, fully 25% of the US workforce was working in a low-wage job (Mason 
and Salverda, 2010). Low-wage work is largely a question of low-autonomy work, which 
is low-skill, labor-intensive and subject to continuous downward pressure on wages due 
to structural unemployment in Marx’s (1990 [1867]: 781) sense of ‘the progressive 
production of a relative surplus population’ under capitalism. Indeed, all of the low-wage 
occupations in the US – sales, food preparation and serving, building maintenance and 
grounds cleaning, personal care and service, and healthcare support – are low-autonomy 
occupations.1 Increasing education could reduce inequality in the upper half of the wage 
distribution, but it would have little effect on the problem of structural demand for low-
autonomy work (for a complementary critique of human capital policies, see Lafer 2002).  
Sociological and related institutional explanations for rising inequality, the growth 
of low-wage work, and jobs poor on other characteristics have focused on deunionization, 
internationalization and intensified competition, deregulation and financialization 
(Appelbaum and Schmitt, 2009; Kalleberg, 2011). Institutional scholars have also 
emphasized managerial choice regarding employment strategy, generally discussed in 
terms of high-road (quality/training/high wage) versus low-road (relentless cost cutting) 
strategy (e.g. Hunter, 2000; Appelbaum and Schmitt, 2009). Such institutional analyses 
have generated critical insights on job quality and labor market outcomes, but they 
remain highly descriptive and there has been little attempt to develop theoretical analysis 
of how disparate trends in job quality – including ongoing structural demand for low-
autonomy labor – may be understood as part of the systematic, institutional 
transformation of capitalism. And while it has been noted that liberal-market institutional 
contexts like the US tend to encourage low-road strategies (Appelbaum and Schmitt, 
2009) and shown that certain entry-level jobs, particularly in front-line services, may not 
be amenable to high-road upgrading (Bailey and Bernhardt, 1997), we still do not have a 
full understanding of why, within particular industries and occupations, if the high-road 
approach is viable and profitable, some managers take it but others do not? In order to 
provide further traction for a fuller answer to this question, I present here an analytical 
framework for analyzing job quality based on a critically reconstructed regulation theory 
of Fordism and postfordism.  
In order for the Fordism/postfordism framework to be robust, it must be extended 
beyond its traditional focus on the manufacturing labor process to account for variation 
across industries and occupations. To do so, I draw on Herzenberg et al.’s (1998) 
typology of four generic labor process types: high autonomy, semiautonomous, tightly-
constrained and unrationalized labor-intensive. I then conceptualize Fordism and 
postfordism as institutional regimes of competition, each with its own dominant logic of 
employment relations, which accounts for dominant tendencies in job quality within 
generic labor process types, but allows for deviation by individual organizations. My 
analysis shows a slight decline from 1960 to 2005 in low-autonomy jobs (unrationalized 
labor-intensive jobs and tightly-constrained jobs) along with a corresponding rise in high-
skill autonomous jobs. Yet, Wright and Dwyer (2003) found that low-wage work has 
made up an increasing proportion of total employment, accounting for 10% of total 
growth in full-time jobs in the 1960s, but 20% in the 1980s and 1990s. This raises a 
puzzle: If the proportion of low-autonomy jobs has declined, how can we explain the 
rising proportion of low-wage work in overall job growth? The answer proposed here is 
as follows. The Fordist regime provided the institutional conditions for many low-
autonomy jobs to offer decent wages. But Fordism ultimately gave way to a postfordist 
regime of competition driven by the material transformations of internationalization and 
tertiarization (i.e. growing importance of service sectors), which gave rise to a dominant 
logic of employment externalization, resulting in a return to the market determination of 
wages and hence a greater percentage of low-autonomy jobs becoming low-wage.   
The argument takes place in two stages. I first outline a critical reconstruction of 
the Fordism/postfordism framework focusing on a historical analysis of institutional 
dynamics of competition, with particular emphasis on institutional logics of employment 
relations regarding low-autonomy work. The second stage of the argument draws on the 
reconstructed theory to present a framework for analyzing historical and cross-sectional 
variation within and across generic labor process types.  
 
Fordism and postfordism: A Marxist regulationist reconstruction 
The concept of Fordism was developed by French regulation theorists as part of a broader 
research program rejecting the argument that markets are self-regulating, focusing instead 
on how the crisis-prone capitalist economy secures temporary institutional fixes to ensure 
expanded reproduction. Aglietta (2000 [1979]) argued that Fordism was a regime of 
accumulation combining a production model of Taylorist mass production with mass 
consumption, the latter achieved through the institutionalization of class compromise via 
unionization and the welfare state. Boyer (1979) introduced the concept of monopoly 
regulation as a form of regulation stabilizing the Fordist accumulation regime. Finally, 
Lipietz (1984) seems to have been the first to introduce the terminology of ‘mode of 
regulation.’ Together, these contributions established the standard regulationist growth 
model in which strong growth requires a mode of regulation that stabilizes and guides an 
accumulation regime. Elsewhere (Vidal, forthcoming-b), I have developed a Marxist 
theory of accumulation regimes that does not rely on the concept of a mode of regulation, 
which provides an unwarranted expectation of strong growth under capitalism, assumes a 
theoretically untenable level of coherence across institutional domains, and is based on an 
unsound distinction between institutions and the underlying accumulation regime. 
Regulation theory does not need the concept of mode of regulation to continue examining 
settlements within and across institutional domains, including employment relations and 
forms of competition, on which I focus here, as well as money and credit, the state and 
the fit of national economies into the international system (Boyer and Saillard, 2002).  
Many non-regulationist employment relations scholars adopted the concept of 
postfordism, which came to be widely viewed, with no small amount of speculation, as a 
model of flexible production based on a post-Taylorist labor process. Vallas (1999: 76) 
argued that postfordism is based on a ‘single, unitary logic’ that cannot make sense of the 
contradictory effects of corporate attempts to achieve flexibility on different groups of 
workers, while Thompson (2003) similarly noted that it assumes a degree of institutional 
coherence inconsistent with the empirical diversity of organizational arrangements. The 
critiques made by Vallas and Thompson are sound: a singular model of production based 
on a particular labor process does not provide a good basis for distinguishing between 
economic periods because there are multiple tendencies and broad organizational 
diversity. The problem is in large part a relic of the manufacturing-centric focus of these 
early debates. And while regulationists always emphasized the links between the labor 
process, wider institutions and the state, they too argued that there was a specifically 
Fordist production model and labor process – supply-driven mass production with 
Taylorism – and that postfordism would be rooted in a flexible production model based 
on either a neo-Taylorist or post-Taylorist labor process (Lipietz, 1987; Aglietta, 2000 
[1979]; Boyer and Saillard, 2002). If a regulationist approach to postfordism is to be 
analytically valuable, it needs to be reconstructed to emphasize the differentiated 
institutional contexts within which labor process strategy is developed, employment 
relations established, and forms of competition institutionalized.  
The first step, then, is to distinguish between generic types of labor process – the 
particular configuration of physical technologies, task environments and authority 
relations. I draw on the typology of labor processes developed by Herzenberg and 
colleagues (1998), with some slight modifications in the definitions of the types. High-
skill autonomous work (e.g. executives and professionals) typically requires university 
education and often postgraduate education; the task/authority environment allows 
significant discretion in decision making. Semiautonomous work (e.g. supervisors and 
secretaries) may be semi- or high-skilled, requiring either extensive job-specific, 
vocational and/or university training; the task/authority environment requires moderate 
levels of discretion, but still may be fairly standardized. Tightly-constrained work (e.g. 
machine operators and clerks) is low- or semi-skilled, requiring either job-specific or 
limited vocational training; the task environment is highly standardized and work is 
paced by machine technology, customer pressure, or flow of work. Unrationalized labor-
intensive work (e.g. cooks and janitors) is low skill in terms of required vocational 
training or education; work is not susceptible to machine pacing or quality monitoring. 
The theory I develop in the next section does not yield predictions with regard to changes 
in the distribution of these generic labor process types over time; rather, the main thrust is 
to present a framework for analyzing variation of job quality within and across the labor 
process types, with particular emphasis on low-autonomy work (i.e. tightly-constrained 
and unrationalized labor-intensive labor processes).  
 
Institutional dynamics of competition  
Fordism was a unique period in that it allowed the taming of the market through a 
particular institutional regime. While this regime included state regulation, the more 
important point from a regulation theoretic perspective is the broader institutional 
context, which, allowed not only an interventionist Keynesian welfare state, but also a 
class compromise between capital and labor, creating oligopolistic competition, in which 
wages were indexed to productivity, in an economic core sufficiently large to generate an 
economy-wide rise in real median wages and a corresponding decline in income 
inequality (Vidal, forthcoming-a). This institutional conjuncture was made possible not 
through sheer political will but rather because it took place at a specific stage in 
development of the capitalist division of labor – a nationally-bound, mass production 
economy. In particular, labor markets were segmented along organizational lines with a 
core of large firms that were highly capitalized, technologically sophisticated and heavily 
unionized, and a periphery of smaller firms that were more labor-intensive, nonunion and 
subject to intensive price competition (Hodson, 1978; Kalleberg et al., 1981). The large 
core firms, in industries such as autos, steel, chemicals and banking, were vertically-
integrated with internal labor markets, including detailed job ladders with well-defined 
training and promotion opportunities, and administratively-determined wages associated 
with positions rather than individuals (Osterman, 1984). While the core was dominated 
by large manufacturing firms, many large retail sales firms, such as Sears, adopted a 
‘welfare capitalism’ model similar to manufacturing firms (Jacoby, 1997).  
 It is widely agreed, by nonmarxists (Harrison and Bluestone, 1988) as well as 
Marxists (Lipietz, 1987), that a severe decline in the profit rate beginning in the late 
1960s set off a corporate scramble to restore profitability, which began to recover in the 
late 1980s, finally reaching pre-crisis levels by the late 1990s (Wolff, 2003). In response 
to the profit-rate crisis, core American corporations began to increasingly resist unions 
and turn to market-determined wages (Harrison and Bluestone, 1988), allowing the 
market to increasingly penetrate into core organizations (Cappelli, 1995; Hauptmeier, 
2011). Additionally, the wave of restructuring accelerated the changing division of labor 
through global outsourcing and diversification of large corporations into a range of 
service sectors (Harrison and Bluestone, 1988), resulting in a shift in power from 
manufacturing firms toward large retailers controlling global supply chains (Gereffi, 
1994). The profit rate was eventually recovered through organizational restructuring that 
generated stagnating wages and growing job polarization (Vidal, forthcoming-a). Key 
aspects of this organizational restructuring – the breakdown of training and promotion 
ladders in the move to flatter organizations, declining job security, and the rise of 
nonstandard work and performance-related wages – have been described broadly as 
employment externalization (Cappelli, 1995).  
My argument here is that a cluster of closely-related and mutually-reinforcing 
material transformations – internationalization of production, domestic sectoral 
transformation toward a more service-based economy, and the ascendance of buyer-
driven commodity chains – have given rise to a new dominant logic of externalized 
employment relations even within core firms. As I will explain momentarily, the concept 
of institutional logic provides a theory of the cultural institutionalization of the economic 
field and a framework for analyzing (restricted) managerial choice and dominant 
tendencies. But I first examine the underlying material changes. Table 1 shows the largest 
major sectors of the economy in 1955 and 2005. Manufacturing declined from 26.1 to 
10.6% of total nonfarm employment. The government, professional and business services 
and retail trade sectors increased enough that each individually now employs more 
workers than manufacturing, while leisure and hospitality nearly doubled, from 5.3 to 
9.6%, and finance, insurance and real estate grew by over 50% from 3.7 to 6.1%. Table 1 
also presents data (only available for 2005) on low-wage industries, showing that in 2005 
26% of the entire nonfarm economy consisted of low-wage industries. It is not possible to 
make comparisons of growth of low-wage industries using only wage data on 2005 
because we cannot be sure if what are low-wage industries in 2005 were low-wage 
industries in 1955, due to institutional transformations in wage setting. The evidence 
presented in the following section strongly suggests there are important differences in 
wage setting institutions across the two regimes.  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
INSERT TABLES 1 and 2 ABOUT HERE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Regarding the core of the domestic economy, Table 2 shows the largest 
employers in 2011. Among the top 25 largest employers by employment, only two are 
manufacturing firms (GE, HP), while seven of these are general merchandisers and a 
further three are corporations that run eating and drinking establishments. In 1955 the top 
10 by employment, in order, were GM, Exxon Mobil, US Steel, GE, Chrysler, Amoco, 
CBS, AT&T, Goodyear and Firestone.2 This transformation in the complex division of 
labor has generated a concomitant shift in economic power, as control of increasingly 
global supply chains has shifted from manufacturing firms to large retailers (Gereffi, 
1994). Consistent with this argument about the growing power of retailers, Table 2 also 
lists the ranking of the top 25 employers by total revenue, showing that 15 of these top 
employers were among the top 50 US companies by total revenue, including five general 
retailers: Wal-Mart, Target, Home Depot, Best Buy and Lowe’s.   
While the sectoral transformation of the US economy provides the material basis 
for employment strategy, hard institutional context and incentive-based analysis cannot 
provide a full explanation of variations in job quality. For instance, while core service 
firms such as Wal-Mart are infamous for providing bad jobs in terms of wages, training 
and promotion opportunities, Wal-Mart has competitors that offer substantially higher 
wages, including the largely non-union Costco, which offered average wages 48% higher 
than Sam’s Club in 2004 (Carré et al., 2011). A question that has plagued employment 
relations scholars advocating the high road is why more employers do not take it? If we 
are interested in better understanding how managers experience competitive pressures 
and make decisions in the face of these – hence variation in job quality over time and 
across organizations – then analysis must focus on more than hard institutions and 
incentives. To address the issue of employment strategy, I suggest using the concept of 
institutional logic, which refers to ‘cultural beliefs and rules that structure cognition and 
guide decision making in a field’ (Lounsbury, 2007: 289).  
Research on institutional logics examines how technical concerns with 
organizational efficiency are embedded in broader institutional beliefs (Lounsbury, 
2007). Institutional logics have both material and symbolic aspects, being embedded in 
the practice of prominent organizations and also elaborated as best practice in industry 
discourse. This approach offers a socio-cultural alternative to the economic approach: 
rather than assuming that a single maximizing economic logic always exists, and 
studying organizations without talking to actual managers, the sociological institutionalist 
approach focuses on how institutional logics ‘shape rational, mindful behavior’ 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008: 100). Critically, where dominant institutional logics exist 
they tend to heavily restrict managerial choice; while any particular manager may deviate 
from or consciously reject a dominant logic, particularly when it is normative and does 
not have effective enforcement mechanisms (Greenwood et al., 2010), logics provide 
cultural resources for understanding concrete situations and tend to shape managerial 
understanding of best strategy. How managers react to institutional logics in particular 
situations is an empirical question, but the theoretical expectation is that where there is a 
dominant logic, it will widely shape practice.  
In the Fordist context of a nationally-bound economy, American firms in the 
economic core organized employment relations according to a logic of internalization, 
under which best practice was understood to include internalizing activities and 
competencies and, in part due to pressure from unions, developing internal labor markets 
and protecting workers from market forces. Thus, under the Fordist logic of 
internalization, a large percentage of low-autonomy jobs, from assemblers to janitors to 
clerks, were given (i) security, (ii) decent wages, and (iii) opportunities for training and 
promotion. In the postfordist context of internationalization and a shift in the economic 
core from manufacturing to service firms, the dominant logic of employment relations 
has become externalization, in which managers now favor ‘asset light’ strategies, 
focusing on ‘core competencies’ and subjecting workers to market pressures (including 
deunionization). Under the postfordist logic of externalization, the theory suggests that 
there will be a strong tendency toward the degradation of low-autonomy work in terms of 
all three of these aspects of job quality. I now turn to examine the empirical evidence on 
historical trends in employment externalization before presenting a detailed framework 
for analyzing externalization and job quality.   
 
Employment externalization within postfordism 
In Cappelli’s (1995) early discussion of employment externalization, he emphasized a 
number of practices that appeared to constitute a shift away from the Fordist standard of 
internalizing employment, leading to the increased marketization of employment. Among 
the core practices were the three aspects of job quality noted in the foregoing section: 
wages (a shift from wages associated with positions to wages determined by 
performance), training and promotion opportunities, and job security. However, Jacoby 
(1999: 124) challenged the externalization thesis, arguing unequivocally that ‘the welfare 
capitalist approach remains in place. Career-type employment practices – an amalgam 
that economists term “internal labor markets” – are still the norm ….’ While Jacoby 
provided statistical evidence of overall stability in job tenures, and argued that 
household-name companies such as AT&T and Lowe’s continue to provide ‘career-type 
jobs,’ he did not actually present any evidence on training and promotion opportunities, 
that is, internal labor markets. This is understandable because, as Cappelli noted, there is 
a lack of systematic, long-term quantitative data on internal labor markets. Nonetheless, 
Jacoby emphasized institutional stability to the neglect of important qualitative shifts in 
labor market institutions. In particular, as discussed by Cappelli (1999) and Kalleberg 
(2011), there is evidence of more outside hiring and less internal training (suggesting a 
decline in internal promotion), a shift from job-based to performance-based pay, and the 
growth of flatter firm hierarchies (reducing the number of positions across which 
employees are able to move).  
More recently, McGovern et al. (2007: 52, 60) presented data for the UK on the 
‘underlying continuity of the employment relationship,’ showing that the proportion of 
full-time work remained stable vis-à-vis flexible and temporary forms. They also found 
that the percentage of employees who see their job as part of a ‘recognized promotion or 
career ladder within their organization’ increased from 44.4% in 1984 to 49.8% in 2000. 
This finding appears to contradict the externalization thesis, but it must be considered in 
terms of a wider range of evidence, which I present below. To anticipate my response: 
findings of aggregate changes hide divergent trends across industries, occupations and 
groups of workers. McGovern et al. also referred to a companion survey reported in 
White et al. (2004: 57) showing that two thirds of British employers ‘say that they have 
career ladders which are open to most employees.’ While this finding, particularly in 
combination with employee perceptions, does appear inconsistent with the externalization 
thesis, such figures are likely to be exaggerated by employers, and I reserve assessment 
until examining the objective evidence. Finally, White et al. argued that employers are 
expanding rather than decreasing job grades, but the change they refer to is measured 
over two years from 2000-2. This is surely a weak basis for triumphantly concluding that 
‘it seems that the move towards flatter organizations … has been short lived’ (White et 
al., 2004: 61).  
In response to these questions raised by Jacoby, McGovern, White and 
colleagues, I want to take each of the three main facets of externalization under 
consideration here and attempt to present a more nuanced understanding of long-term 
trends. On security, Farber (2008: 12) found that between1973 and 2005 job tenure 
declined substantially for men in the private sector and remained unchanged for women 
in the private sector. In the public sector, there has been an overall increase in job 
tenures, which is particularly pronounced for women. He concluded that ‘the overall 
pattern of results regarding mean job tenure and the incidence of long-term employment 
relationships suggests that there has been as substantial decline in long-term employment 
opportunities and a concomitant reduction in job security in the private sector,’ but ‘this 
decline has been offset for females by their increased attachment to the labor force.’ 
Additionally, Bernhardt and Marcotte (2000) found that black workers have experienced 
the largest decline in job stability since the 1970s.  
On the second issue, wages, the externalization thesis as formulated by Cappelli – 
an increase in performance-related pay – would suggest more variable pay within 
occupations. Data supporting this argument were presented in Bernhardt and colleagues’ 
(2001) analysis of the National Longitudinal Surveys comparing two cohorts of young 
men, one which entered the labor market in the middle to late 1960s and another that 
entered in the early 1980s: increased earnings variably in the recent cohort. In my 
formulation, I argue for a more general move to market-determined wages, particularly 
for low-autonomy jobs, in which I expect to see a larger proportion of these being low-
wage jobs in the postfordist period. Support for this expectation is provided by an 
analysis of CPS data on all full-time jobs by Wright and Dwyer (2003), in which they 
compared job growth during the 1960s to growth in the 1990s. They found that for the 
1960s, 2% of job growth occurred in the lowest job-quality decile, 30% in the middle two 
deciles, and 40% in the top three deciles. In contrast, in the 1990s 17% of job growth 
occurred in the lowest job-quality decile, 11% in the middle two deciles, and 50% in the 
top three deciles. This finding provides strong evidence in support of the argument that a 
large proportion of entry-level jobs, which tend to be low-autonomy jobs, were paid 
decent wages under Fordism, but are increasingly being paid bottom-level wages under 
postfordism. With regard to the question of compositional change versus a more general 
turn to market-determined wages, Bernhardt et al. (2001: 141, 158) presented evidence 
showing that compositional shifts away from manufacturing toward services did not 
account for most of the rise in low-wage work. Rather, the bulk of this growth was 
explained by ‘changes in the pay structure within industries,’ in particular, declining pay 
for those with less than a college degree.  
Finally, the third facet of externalization under consideration is a proposed decline 
in internal training and promotion opportunities, for which there is very little direct, 
systematic evidence. In their cohort study, Bernhardt et al. (2001: 111, 150) examined 
individual wage growth of male workers from age 16 to 34, thus providing perhaps the 
only true measure of growth of low-wage careers in the US. They found ‘a marked 
deterioration in upward mobility,’ with median wage growth in the 1980s cohort 21% 
lower than the 1960s cohort. Remarkably, the percentage of male workers in low-wage 
careers across the two cohorts more than doubled, from 12.2 to 27.6%. This growth hit 
workers with a high school diploma or less the hardest, increasing from 14.4 to 35.3%, 
but even workers with a bachelor’s degree or higher saw an increase in low-wage careers 
from 10.4 to 14.1%. While Bernhardt and colleagues’ study is based on data for males, in 
a multi-country comparative study Mason and Salverda (2010: 48) found that in the US 
women are more likely than men to be in low-wage work and that the chances of upward 
mobility for low-wage workers are limited, with a high risk of ‘cycling between low pay 
and no pay.’  
While the foregoing provides fairly strong evidence of a rise in dead-end work 
under postfordist competition, this does not necessarily imply an overall decrease in 
training and promotion opportunities within firms. For instance, in their case study of the 
food service industry Lane et al. (2003) found that shifting subcontracting relations 
resulted in a decline and recomposition of internal labor markets, a change that improved 
opportunities for some workers but reduced internal advancement opportunities for the 
least educated workers. It may very well be that in certain industries or occupations, for 
certain types of workers, particularly more educated workers, firms are continuing to 
develop various opportunities for training and promotion. This may help explain the 
findings of McGovern and colleagues (White et al., 2004; McGovern et al., 2007); these 
data are for the UK, but the latter and the US are institutionally similar and it may be that 
internal labor markets in both countries are being maintained or reconstructed for the 
majority of workers, even if a substantial minority of workers at the bottom of the labor 
market have decreasing access to such opportunities. This interpretation is consistent with 
Bernhardt and Marcotte’s (2000: 35) review of research on internal labor markets, in 
which they found strong evidence indicating a decline in nonmarket restrictions on wage 
setting, concluding that ‘workers at the low end of the wage distribution have been the 
ones most affected by the restructuring of work.’ I now turn to examine the extent of 
demand for low-autonomy jobs in the postfordist US economy and provide a framework 
for analyzing variations within these types of jobs.  
 
Labor processes, employment relations and competitive dynamics 
Shifts in the distribution of generic labor processes 
Herzenberg et al. (1998) coded 840 detailed occupations from CPS data into four generic 
labor process types and examined the changes from 1979-1996. I have slightly revised 
their coding and extended the analysis to the years 1960 and 2005, using IPUMS Census 
microdata (Ruggles et al., 2010). The tables in the data appendix list my revised coding 
along with changes I made to Herzenberg et al.’s coding.3 Table 3 presents the 
employment share by labor process type and the average annual income for 1960 and 
2005.4 Based on my coding of the labor process types, averaging between the two point 
estimates, from 1960-2005 high-skill autonomous jobs increased from 30.5 to 38.5%, 
semiautonomous jobs decreased from 29 to 26.5%, tightly constrained jobs decreased 
from 8.5 to 6.5% and unrationalized labor-intensive jobs decreased from 32 to 28%. 
While the 26% increase in high-skill autonomous jobs over the 45 year period is 
consistent with the skill-biased technical change thesis, equally remarkable is the relative 
continuity across the low-autonomy labor process types. Low-autonomy jobs accounted 
for around 41% of total employment in 1960 but continue, after 45 years of technological 
progress, to account for fully 35% of total employment. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Now, Autor and colleagues (2003) developed a ‘task model’ to add explanatory 
power to the SBTC thesis, and they innovatively constructed a unique data set matching 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles task measures with data on occupations from the 
Census and CPS. Their findings for 1960 to 1998 show a decline in nonroutine manual 
tasks (measure: Eye-Hand-Foot coordination) by 8.7 centiles, a smaller but still 
substantial decline in routine cognitive tasks (Sets limits, Tolerances, or Standards) by 
5.4 centiles, and a largely stable trend in routine manual tasks (Finger Dexterity), down 
just .8 centiles over the 38 year period. The first task measure is conceptually related to 
unrationalized labor-intensive occupations, the second two to tightly-constrained 
occupations. However, while this analysis does show a decrease in nonroutine manual 
and routine cognitive labor content across the entire economy, this is not the same as a 
decline in unrationalized labor-intensive or tightly-constrained occupations. Specifically, 
Autor et al.’s analysis measured the intensity of a specific task within each occupation 
and then averaged these intensities for each task across the entire economy. It thus shows 
a relative decline in occupations intensively requiring a given task, but it does not directly 
map on to the distribution of occupations as such. While there appears to have been an 
economywide decline in the task content requiring eye-hand foot coordination and setting 
of limits, tolerances and standards, this analysis does not directly address the extent of 
occupations that are primarily routine (tightly-constrained) or nonroutine manual 
(unrationalized labor-intensive). Autor et al. demonstrated a technologically-driven 
process of economywide upgrading in employment task content, and while some of this 
can be seen in my labor process findings – small declines in low-autonomy and 
semiautonomous work with a proportional increase in high-skill autonomous work – it 
did not translate into a substantial decline in low-autonomy occupations. To understand 
trends in job quality – both over time and across jobs – we need to examine whole jobs 
and how managers configure jobs within particular organizational, occupational and 
industrial contexts. I thus now present an analytical framework for analyzing job quality. 
Generic labor processes and the quality of employment: An analytical framework 
A number of recent studies present extensive discussions of measures of job quality. 
Clark (2005) used six measures: pay, hours of work, future prospects (promotion and job 
security), how hard or difficult the job is, job content (interest, prestige and 
independence), and interpersonal relationships. Green (2006) presented an in-depth 
discussion of various measures, focusing his analysis on six: skill, effort, discretion, pay, 
risks and security, and job satisfaction. Sengupta et al. (2009) used five: pay, security, the 
opportunity for training and promotion, the extent of work intensification or stress, and 
autonomy. Kalleberg (2011) examined four broad aspects: pay and fringe benefits 
(including flexible work time options and whether a job provides opportunities for 
increasing earnings over time), control over tasks, intrinsic rewards and time at work.  
Job satisfaction is a multidimensional variable that is presumably the outcome of 
the other quality attributes. Skill, autonomy/discretion and interest/intrinsic rewards 
inhere in the labor process types themselves. But the other attributes are more variable 
aspects of the employment relationship, and the postfordist framework suggests that such 
variability is increasing, particularly for low-autonomy jobs. As discussed above, the 
theory suggests that under a dominant logic of externalization there will be a strong 
tendency toward reduced wages, security and opportunities for training and promotion in 
low-autonomy work. Additionally, to the extent that externalization is part of a broader 
push toward marketization of the employment relation under intensified competition, it 
would be expected to be associated with greater work intensification. I thus focus my 
analysis on these four aspects of employment quality that have a direct theoretical 
relation to externalization: pay, security, opportunity for training and promotion, and 
work intensification (effort/pace). While interpersonal relationships are fundamentally 
important, I leave this aspect out because it does not have a clear relation to 
externalization.  
 Combining the four employment quality attributes with the four labor process 
types produces the typology of 18 job types presented in Table 4. This table is a heuristic 
meant to provide a framework for understanding the full range of possible job outcomes 
in terms of a given labor process and core aspects of employment quality. It is a heuristic 
because the table can be tailored for specific empirical uses: it is meant to stimulate 
research on various empirical questions and contexts, while allowing researchers to focus 
in on a particular part of the table. The values represent a typology of all feasible 
variations of job quality attributes within each labor process type, which are then ordered 
into one of three broad job quality types based on reasoning provided below. There are 
three main ways in which Table 4 can be read and used for analyzing job quality: in 
terms of the three broad job quality categories; how the employment quality indicators 
vary within generic labor process types, based on institutional context and managerial 
choice; and whether one type of generic labor process can be transformed into another 
through managerial choice. 
First, taking the job quality categories, while the debate has largely focused on a 
dichotomy between good versus bad jobs, Sengupta et al. (2009) correctly noted that 
most jobs have mixes of good and bad characteristics. They propose a typology between 
good, bad and ‘ordinary’ jobs. Following Sengupta et al., Table 4 reduces down to three 
job quality categories.5 Good jobs are those that offer some autonomy with relatively 
high wages and security or have low autonomy but offer relatively high wages, security 
and opportunities for training and promotion (OTP). Bad jobs are those that are low-wage 
and dead-end (no OTP); relatively high wage but dead-end and insecure; or relatively 
high wage but dead-end and intense. Decent jobs, finally, include semiautonomous jobs 
that are relatively high wage and secure but without opportunities for promotion, and low 
autonomy jobs that are either relatively high wage and secure or low wage but secure 
with opportunities for promotion.  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
INSERT TABLES 4 and 5 ABOUT HERE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Let me provide some more remarks on the distribution of work systems across the 
three job quality categories and the underlying assumptions. High-skill autonomous jobs 
only appear in the good jobs category because it is assumed that they will offer high-
wages, that their incumbents will have security (which may be across rather than within 
organizations) and that they inherently offer intrinsic rewards, so therefore do not require 
additional training and promotion opportunities. These jobs may be intense but the 
workers that fill them, being at the top of the labor market, are likely to be able to 
voluntarily trade intense work for high-wages and intrinsically rewarding work. For 
similar reasons semiautonomous work is considered good if it has relatively high-wages 
and security; the framework assumes that this could be considered good work for some 
workers as such (depending on their work orientation), but others may desire even higher 
amounts of wage income and/or intrinsic rewards and hence if a semiautonomous job has 
relatively high wages and security but no OTP, it is classified as a decent job. Because 
semiautonomous work is assumed to offer fewer intrinsic rewards and lower wages than 
high-skill autonomous work, it is considered to be a bad job if subject to high levels of 
intensification. Tightly-constrained and unrationalized labor-intensive jobs are both 
considered to be good jobs if they offer relatively high wages, security and OTP; they are 
considered to be decent jobs if they offer relatively high wages and security, but not OTP, 
or if they offer security and OTP but have low wages, under the assumption that OTP 
will lead to higher wages and more intrinsically rewarding work; they are bad jobs if they 
are intense, offer relatively high wages but no security or OTP, or if they have low-wages 
and no OTP. 
Second, Table 4 may be used to examine how the employment quality indicators 
vary within generic labor process types. It could be used in this way for quantitative 
analysis of historical or cross-sectional trends in job quality within generic labor process 
types or qualitative research on the extent to which the logic of externalization (or some 
other employment logic) shapes managerial strategy. In particular how do managers 
conceive best practice regarding low-autonomy work, and why do some, perhaps most, 
externalize on these job quality attributes while other managers do not? It could also 
stimulate more focused research on particular types of occupations that are closely related 
in terms of generic labor process, and therefore Table 4 lists the top three or four detailed 
occupations within each labor process type and Table 5 lists the major occupations within 
each type.  
Third, Table 4 may be used to focus on the question of upgrading or downgrading 
across labor process types. This is inherent in the conceptualization of the types, because 
as Herzenberg et al. (1998) noted, for certain types of tasks different management 
philosophies may lead to a task set being performed in different ways. They argued such 
changes are most likely between semiautonomous and unrationalized labor-intensive 
work, and they use the example of nursing aides. Below I will provide a brief illustration 
with regard to manufacturing machine operators. On this assumption, in the coding many 
occupations are split between two or more generic labor process types, as shown in the 
appendix. Among the major detailed occupations that are in the semiautonomous 
category and at least one other category are clerks and cashiers, administrative support, 
computer equipment operators, assemblers and machine operators. There is fertile ground 
for research on such variation, and research could naturally add the other job quality 
attributes in Table 4 for further analytical leverage. 
The research program for this framework, in my view, is to use Table 4 (as well 
as Table 5 on major occupations within generic labor process types) to document, 
interpret and theorize how variation in strategy is not simply a maximizing rational 
response to environmental incentives but a cultural and political process. For space 
reasons I can only provide the briefest of illustrations of how this research program might 
commence. My own research has focused on manufacturing work organization in the US, 
looking at cross-sectional variation across factories (Vidal, 2007b; Vidal, 2007a). While 
these analyses did not focus on the problem of externalization, I used an institutional 
logics approach to examine variation in managerial strategy among small- and mid-sized 
supplier firms I studied (Vidal, 2012). Although managers attempted to pursue rational 
strategies, they differed in a basic way regarding how they saw the role of employee 
involvement in lean production, a difference explained not by their production process, 
industry or location in the supply chain, but by their cultural framing of the situation. A 
normative logic of substantive employee involvement in decision-making and problem-
solving has been widely adopted by high-profile factories, is pushed on suppliers by 
industrial customers, industry associations and consultants, and was well-understood by 
all 47 of the managers and engineers I spoke with. Yet, management in only eight of 24 
factories adopted this logic, under which they reduced their authority hierarchies and 
substantively changed the labor process. The remaining managers adopted a logic of 
consultative participation in which workers were asked to contribute ideas but within a 
traditional authority structure – a hybrid between the normative logic of substantive 
participation and the old dominant logic of Taylorism, whereby it is understood that 
workers cannot responsibly self-manage. In terms of Table 5 and institutional logics, my 
analysis showed how machine operator jobs can be turned into semiautonomous jobs 
(when management adopts a logic of substantive empowerment), but also why they are 
more likely to remain tightly-constrained: despite the normative logic being widely 
understood as ‘best practice’ and ‘world class,’ the majority of managers I observed 
deviated from this logic because they continued to understand their situation through the 
enduring cultural frame of Taylorism (Vidal, 2012). While physical work intensification 
was not an issue in the factories I visited, there is ample evidence that intensification is a 
common outcome under lean, particularly in auto assembly (Stewart et al., 2009; 
Rothstein, forthcoming). Future research could focus on why some managers use lean to 
intensify work but others do not, and to what extent there exists a logic of externalization 
explicitly shaping managerial understanding of the situation and hence driving 
intensification in some factories.   
Finally, and even more briefly, the case of janitorial work illustrates how variation 
over time and across organizations could be studied focusing on political contestation 
within an unrationalized labor-intensive occupation in which the logic of externalization 
– in particular, market-determined wages and lack of training and promotion 
opportunities – would appear to be clearly dominant. Received wisdom suggests that 
janitors used to be incorporated into vertically-integrated corporations, but were likely to 
have been one of the first roles to be outsourced to administrative support firms in the 
transition from Fordism. Historical research could examine the extent to which this is 
true, including whether janitors were part of a unionized, vertically-integrated firms that 
included decent wages or opportunities for training and promotion inside the firm. 
Turning to a cross-sectional (and historical) analysis and illustrating the role of politics, 
nonunion janitorial services firms paid $4.00 an hour in 1982 versus $12.00 an hour with 
full benefits for union firms (Waldinger et al., 1998). As the industry experienced intense 
deunionization in the 1980s, ‘fringe benefits and job security evaporated along with the 
union wage premium’ (Milkman, 2006: 80). However, the SEIU began its ‘Justice for 
Janitors’ campaign in Houston in the mid-1980s and by 2006 had organized workers in 
29 cities, providing relatively high wages and job security for hundreds of thousands of 
workers (Vidal and Kusnet, 2009), turning unrationalized labor-intensive jobs from bad 
jobs into decent jobs. While these brief examples are only suggestive, the theoretical 
framework presented here could provide a powerful basis for examining the 
externalization thesis in more detail, in particular, the extent to which externalization is 
perceived by managers to be a dominant logic of employment relations and thus drives 
dominant tendencies.  
 
Conclusion 
I have presented a reconstructed regulation theory of postfordism that is able to help 
make sense of the expansion of the service sector, organizational diversity and the growth 
of low-wage work. Rather than using Fordism and postfordism as organization-level 
concepts, I use them to refer to institutional regimes of competition. The Fordist regime 
generated rising real wages with strong profits and relative economic stability. Because 
of the fundamental uniqueness of Fordism, I have argued that we should use the term 
postfordism to refer to the general institutional regime that has emerged since the erosion 
and transformation of Fordist institutions. Postfordism, then, refers to an institutional 
regime of competition characterized by highly-competitive, internationalized competition 
generating a growing core of service firms and a dominant logic of externalized 
employment relations, emphasizing lean organizational structures and market-mediated 
employment, where the latter includes market-determined wages, deunionization and 
increased competitive pressures on employee performance. In order to move beyond 
overly-stylized understandings, I introduced a complex typology of job quality, 
distinguishing between generic labor process types and more variable aspects of the 
employment relation.  
The analysis shows that the postfordist regime continues to generate structural 
demand for low-autonomy work – which constitutes over one-third of the jobs – and 
provides evidence that it is increasingly unable to provide decent living standards for the 
workers who fill these positions. The institutions of Fordism were able to provide decent 
work and rising living standards for much of the low-skilled population, primarily 
through oligopolistic competition, strong unions and pattern bargaining inside the union 
sector, and a wage norm outside the union sector relatively close to the union wage. The 
framework presented here can guide fine-grained, qualitative and quantitative analysis of 
changing employment relations within and across generic labor processes.  
 Perhaps the most pressing question is what can be done with regard to low-wage 
work in general, which I have argued is primarily a question of low-autonomy work. 
There are of course no easy answers, but Marxist regulation theory suggests that the 
problem extends beyond technical change, financialization or neoliberal politics; rather, it 
is a problem of the ascendance of the logic of employment externalization resulting from 
internationalized competition and pressures on the profit rate (Vidal, forthcoming-a). To 
the extent that regulation theory reclaims a Marxist pedigree, it assumes the economy is 
irreducibly social, that the social product is the outcome of vast amounts of coordinated 
labor and accumulated knowledge, and that productivity itself is collective. On this view 
there exists an underlying social relation connecting all workers, based on their mutual 
interdependence in the wage labor nexus and through which workers in different labor 
market/employment conditions are able to tap into a certain share of the collective 
product. The point of a concept like postfordism is that however disconnected key 
institutions may appear, the political economy is fundamentally interconnected and 
interdependent. Although high-skill autonomous jobs have increased and there has been a 
slight decrease in low-autonomy jobs, the postfordist regime still systematically generates 
a job structure with a large percentage of low-autonomy jobs and increasingly produces a 
stratum of long-term working poor, whose wages are kept low by the existence of various 
strata of a reserve army of under- and unemployed. To the extent that productivity is an 
outcome of collective labor in a complex division of labor, the productivity of 
autonomous and semiautonomous workers is based in part on routine and nonroutine 
labor, which allows the former to focus on their specialization while benefitting from the 
cheap labor of others. The wage form continues to present interdependent relations – the 
banker and his maid, software developers and their janitors, creatives and their cheap 
goods and services – as independent market transactions. Some things, indeed, don’t 
change.  
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Notes 
 
1 Based on the standard criterion for low-wage work, jobs making less than two-thirds of the overall 
median, analysis of BLS OES data shows that these occupations, constituting 28.4% of the economy, were 
all below or near the cutoff for low wages in 2010 ($22,334). Those just above the cutoff were: building 
maintenance and grounds cleaning (67% of the median), sales and related (73% of the median), and 
healthcare support (74% of the median). 
 2 http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full/1955/. 
 
3 I have created four tables listing the line-by-line differences between their codes and mine for each labor 
process type. These, along with my STATA datasets, coding programs and a text document with reasons 
for my changes are available upon request.   
 
4 As a consistency check I compared the distribution for 2005 based on my coding and that of Herzenberg 
et al. (1998). To do so I applied their coding to the 2005 data, and I report here the average between the two 
point estimates (one using observations with only non-zero income and another using all observations for 
which there were occupational data, including where income was listed as zero). There was little difference 
between the two estimates for high-skill autonomous (38.5 in my coding versus 39% in theirs), a slightly 
higher share in semiautonomous under my coding (26.5 versus 24.5), a slightly higher share in tightly-
constrained (6.5 versus 5.5), and a lower share in unrationalized labor-intensive jobs (28 versus 31.5%). 
Thus, my coding changes did not produce a dramatically different outcome. In any case, I believe my 
coding is slightly more accurate. 
 
5 The notion of ‘ordinary’ has connotations of being commonplace or normal. With the clear trend toward 
job polarization, the middling jobs may not be the most common or the norm. At risk of being overly 
semantic, I want to suggest that a better description of the middling jobs is ‘decent.’ 
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Table 1. Employment and wages in the largest sectors, USA, 1955, 2005 
 Share of total 
nonfarm 
employment, 
1955 (%) 
Share of total 
nonfarm 
employment, 
2005 (%) 
Average 
annual 
wages, 
2005 ($) 
Median 
annual 
wages, 
2005 ($) 
Federal, state and local government 11.8 16.3 44,250 38,940 
Health care and social assistance 15.6 10.9 45,430 33,190 
 Ambulatory health care services and 
hospitals 
-- 7.1 45,545 35,465 
 Nursing and residential care facilities -- 2.1 27,190 22,350 
 Social assistance -- 1.7 25,760 21,400 
Professional and business services 5.6 12.7 48,167 38,113 
 Professional, scientific and technical 
services 
-- 6.1 58,560 46,890 
 Management of companies and 
enterprises 
-- 5.3 56,430 44,840 
 Administrative and support and waste 
management and remediation services 
-- 1.3 29,510 22,610 
Retail trade 8.7 11.4 26,360 20,480 
Leisure and hospitality 5.3 9.6 23,505 18,410 
Manufacturing 26.1 10.6 39,240 31,850 
Finance, insurance and real estate 3.7 6.1 42,025 31,635 
Total 76.8 77.6 -- -- 
All sectors -- -- 37,870 29,430 
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics, Occupational Employment 
Statistics. 
Notes: Data are for total nonfarm employment. The year 2005 was chosen because it is before the recession 
began in December 2007. For 2005, the remaining nonfarm industries, all of which employ less than 6% of 
the total workforce are, in order from largest to smallest: construction, wholesale trade, other services, 
transportation and warehousing, information, educational services, mining, and utilities. 
The OES only provide wage data back to 1997. Median wages in bold are for low-wage industries, 
defined as those making less than two-thirds of the overall median wage. This cutoff was $19,424 in 2005. 
I have also included four industries that are very near to this, specifically, retail trade (70% of the median), 
social assistance (75% of the median), nursing and residential care (76% of the median), administrative and 
support and waste management (77% of the median).   
Table 2. Top 25 largest US companies by employment, 2011  
 Firm Primary 
industry 
Total 
empl. 
(1,000s) 
Rank in 
Fortune 
500 by 
total 
revenue 
 Firm Primary 
industry 
Total 
empl. 
(1,000s) 
Rank in 
Fortune 
500 by 
total 
revenue 
1 Wal-
Mart  
General 
Merch. 
2,100 1 14 Fedex Transp. 269.4 73 
2 UPS Transp. 400.6 48 15 AT&T Telecom
. 
265.4 12 
3 McDon-
ald’s 
Eating & 
Drinking  
400 Not in 
top 100 
16 Citigroup Banks 260 14 
4 IBM Software 
& comp. 
services  
399.4 18 17 Walgreens Food & 
drug 
retailers 
244 23 
5 Yum! 
Brands 
Eating & 
Drinking 
378 Not in 
top 100 
18 Lowe’s 
Compa-
nies 
General 
Merch. 
234 50 
6 Target General 
Merch. 
355 33 19 Accenture  Comp. 
related 
services 
204 Not in 
top 100 
7 Kroger Food & 
drug 
retailers 
338 25 20 Verizon Telecom
. 
194.4 16 
8 Hewlett-
Packard 
Tech. 
hardware 
& equip.  
324.6 11 21 Hospital 
Corp. of 
America 
Hospi-
tals 
194 Not in 
top 100 
9 Home 
Depot 
General 
Merch. 
321 30 22 Best Buy General 
Merch. 
180 47 
10 PepsiCo Bever-
ages 
294 43 23 Safeway Food & 
drug 
retailers 
180 60 
11 General 
Electric 
Electrical 
equip. 
287 6 24 Darden 
Restau-
rants 
Eating 
& 
Drinkin
g 
174 Not in 
top 100 
12 CVS 
Care-
mark 
Food & 
drug 
retailers 
280 21 25 TJX 
Compa-
nies 
General 
Merch. 
166 Not in 
top 100 
13 Sears 
Hold-
ings 
General 
Merch. 
280 57      
Source: Financial Times 500 (employment), Fortune 500 (revenue).  
Notes: These numbers are for worldwide employment, so this is only a proxy for the largest firms in the 
US. While some like Wal-Mart and McDonalds have significant international presence, some appear not to 
have any international presence, such as Krogers, CVS, Sears, Walgreens, Lowe’s and TJX, and many 
others appear to have minimal international presence, including Target, Best Buy, Home Depot, Safeway.  
Table 3. Employment by generic labor process type, 1960, 2005 
 1960 2005 
 Share of total 
employment 
(%) 
Average 
annual income 
(2005 
dollars)* 
Share of total 
employment 
(%) 
Average 
annual 
income (2005 
dollars)* 
High-skill 
autonomous 28-33 $43,722 38-39 $67,080 
Semiautonomous 28-30 $27,158 26-27 $32,673 
Tightly-
constrained 8-9 $23,484 6-7 $20,615 
Unrationalized 
labor-intensive 31-33 $13,839 28 $17,046 
Source: IPUMS-USA Census microdata (Ruggles et al., 2010), my calculations. 
Notes: Data include total employment, excluding legislators and military. Two estimates of the share of 
total employment are included because there were a substantial amount of observations for employed 
individuals with a designated occupation but with a ‘0’ (zero) for annual income. Estimates in bold include 
only those with a non-zero income (1960 N=515,390; 2005 N=1,234,855), whereas the other estimates 
include employed individuals with a designated occupation but ‘0’ (zero) recorded for annual income (1960 
N=611,593; 2005 N=1,330,590); where there is only one number, the two estimates were identical.  
*Annual income is total pre-tax wage and salary income for the previous year, based on the estimates that 
only include individuals with a non-zero income. These data are reported only as a rough validity check on 
the coding of the labor process types within years and should not be taken as reliable indicators of changes 
in real income within labor process types across years, both because 16% of the 611,593 1960 observations 
with a designated occupation have income recorded as zero and because the variable for ‘weeks worked 
last year’ did not have real values in 1960, so there is no way to control of number of weeks (or hours) 
worked over the year. IPUMS-USA data do not have median wage.  
 
 Table 4. Eighteen job types 
 
Labor process Employment relations 
Largest detailed occupations within 
labor process type 
 
 
High 
wages Security OTP Intense  
Good jobs      
1 High-skill autonomous Y Y   
High-level managers; registered nurses; 
customer service reps, investigators and 
adjusters, except insurance.  
2 Semiautonomous Y Y  - Sales supervisors; sales persons; secretaries; primary school teachers. 
3 Tightly constrained Y Y Y - Assemblers & machine operators; clerks; cashiers. 
4 Unrationalized labor-intensive Y Y Y - 
Cooks; nursing aides, orderlies & 
attendants; janitors. 
Decent jobs      
5 Semiautonomous Y Y - - Sales supervisors; sales persons; secretaries; primary school teachers. 
6 Tightly constrained Y Y - - Assemblers & machine operators; clerks; cashiers. 
7 Tightly constrained - Y Y - Assemblers & machine operators; clerks; cashiers. 
8 Unrationalized labor-intensive Y Y - - 
Cooks; nursing aides, orderlies & 
attendants; janitors. 
9 Unrationalized labor-intensive - Y Y - 
Cooks; nursing aides, orderlies & 
attendants; janitors. 
Bad jobs      
10 Semiautonomous Y Y - Y Sales supervisors; sales persons; secretaries; primary school teachers. 
11 Semiautonomous Y - -  Sales supervisors; sales persons; secretaries; primary school teachers. 
12 Semiautonomous -  -  Sales supervisors; sales persons; secretaries; primary school teachers. 
13 Tightly constrained  Y Y - Y Assemblers & machine operators; clerks; cashiers. 
14 Tightly constrained Y - -  Assemblers & machine operators; clerks; cashiers. 
15 Tightly constrained -  -  Assemblers & machine operators; clerks; cashiers. 
16 Unrationalized labor-intensive Y Y - Y 
Cooks; nursing aides, orderlies & 
attendants; janitors. 
17 Unrationalized labor-intensive Y - -  
Cooks; nursing aides, orderlies & 
attendants; janitors. 
18 Unrationalized labor-intensive -  -  
Cooks; nursing aides, orderlies & 
attendants; janitors. 
Notes: High wages = living wage; Security may be job or occupational; OTP = opportunities for training 
and promotion; Intense = where work is or has been intensified to a degree not offset by high wages.  
 If a work system has a given practice, it is noted with a ‘Y’. If it does not have the practice, it is 
noted with a ‘-’. If there is nothing in a cell, the work system may or may not have the practice. The 
typology is meant to be exhaustive of all possible combinations for which there is a conceivable really-
existing job in the US.  
Table 5. Major occupations within generic labor process types  
High-skill autonomous work 
1960 2005 
Precision production, craft & repair occupations 
(27.1%) 
Executive, admin. & managerial occupations 
(24.4%) 
Professional specialty occupations (20.5%) 
Retail and personal services sales (5.7%) 
Therapists, primary & secondary teachers (5.6%) 
Executive, admin. & managerial occupations 
(29.4%) 
Professional specialty occupations (28.8%) 
Precision production, craft & repair occupations 
(11.4%) 
Therapists, primary & secondary teachers (7.3%) 
Accountants & auditors, insurance underwriters, 
other financial specialists & management analysts 
(5.9%) 
Semiautonomous work 
1960 2005 
Precision production, craft & repair occupations 
(25.5%) 
Administrative support occupations (24.8%) 
Retail & personal services sales (16.2%) 
Assemblers & machine operators (10.2%) 
Truck, delivery & tractor drivers & bus drivers 
(6.6%) 
Therapists, primary & secondary teachers (5.5%) 
 
Administrative support occupations (20.9%) 
Precision production, craft & repair occupations 
(18.6%) 
Selected supervisors (16.3%)* 
Therapists, primary & secondary teachers (11.6%) 
Technologists and technicians & legal assistants 
(7.1%) 
Retail & personal services sales (5.9%) 
Truck, delivery & tractor drivers & bus drivers 
(5.7%) 
Tightly-constrained work 
1960 2005 
Assemblers & machine operators (71.2%) 
Prod. inspectors, testers, samplers & weighers 
(10.7%) 
Phone operators, bank tellers & data entry keyers 
(9.8%) 
Clerks & cashiers (6.7%) 
Clerks & cashiers (51.0%) 
Assemblers & machine operators (28.5%) 
Phone operators, bank tellers & data entry keyers 
(11.3%) 
Prod. inspectors, testers, samplers & weighers 
(8.2%) 
Unrationalized labor-intensive work 
1960 2005 
Service occupations (28.6%) 
Administrative support occupations (23.2%) 
Handlers, cleaners, helpers & laborers (16.4%) 
Assemblers & machine operators (10.2%) 
Farming, forestry, and fishing occupations (6.1%) 
Truck, delivery & tractor drivers & bus drivers 
(5.9%) 
Service occupations (42.2%) 
Administrative support occupations (20.5%) 
Handlers, cleaners, helpers & laborers (12.5%) 
Truck, delivery & tractor drivers & bus drivers 
(5.9%) 
Source: IPUMS-USA Census microdata (Ruggles et al., 2010), my calculations. 
Notes: All occupations accounting for more than 5% of a labor process type are shown. 
*None of the codes for selected supervisors were used in the 1960 dataset; supervisors must have been 
classified within other occupations. The selected supervisor occupations account for 1.3% of all 
occupations.   
 
  
 
Data appendix 
 
Table A-1a. Classification of occupations  
High-skill autonomous work 
All executive, administrative, and managerial occupations (codes 003, 004-022); all accountants and 
auditors, insurance underwriters, other financial specialists and management analysts (codes 23-26) and 
highest-wage 25% of other management related occupations (codes 27-37); highest-wage 25% selected 
supervisors (codes 243, 303-307, 413-415, 433, 448, 456, 503, 553-558, 613, 633, 803, 828, 843 and 863); 
select professional specialty occupations (codes 43-097, 113-154, 164-199); highest-wage 50% select 
professional specialty occupations (codes 098-106, 155-163); all airplane pilots and navigators and air 
traffic controllers (226-227); highest-wage 75% of science technicians (223-225) and technicians (228, 
229, 233, 235); highest-wage 25% of technologists and technicians (203-218) and legal assistants (234); all 
sales representatives for finance and business services (codes 253-257); all sales representatives for 
commodities, excluding retail (codes 258-259); highest-wage 25% of retail and personal services sales 
workers (codes 263-274); all adjusters and investigators (codes 375-376); highest-wage 50% of computer 
equipment operators (codes 308-309); all fire fighting and police occupations (codes 417-418); highest-
wage 25% of sheriffs, bailiffs, correctional institution officers (423); highest-wage 25% of barbers, 
hairdressers, and cosmetologists (codes 457-458); all farm operators and managers (codes 473-476); 
highest-wage 50% of precision production, craft, and repair occupations excluding carpet installers and 
drywall installers (codes 503-699, excluding 566 and 573); all printing machine operators (codes 734-737); 
highest-wage 50% of rail transportation occupations (codes 823-826); highest-wage 25% of water 
transportation occupations (codes 828-834); highest-wage 50% of material-moving equipment operators 
(codes 843-859). 
Semiautonomous work 
Lowest-wage 75% of management related occupations, excluding accountants and auditors, underwriters, 
and management analysts (codes 23-37, excluding 023, 024 and 026); lowest-wage 75% selected 
supervisors (codes 243, 303-307, 413-415, 433, 448, 456, 503, 553-558, 613, 633, 803, 828, 843 and 863); 
lowest-wage 50% select professional specialty occupations (codes 098-106, 155-163); lowest-wage 25% of 
science technicians (223-225) and technicians (228, 229, 233, 235); lowest-wage 75% of technologists and 
technicians (203-218) and legal assistants (234); lowest-wage 75% of retail and personal services sales 
workers in codes 263-274; highest-wage 25% of sales counter clerks and cashiers (codes 275-276); highest-
wage 50% of sales-related occupations (codes 283-285); highest-wage 50% of administrative support 
occupations (codes 303-389) except adjusters and investigators in codes 375-376, computer equipment 
operators (codes 308-309), telephone operators (code 348), bank tellers (code 383), and data entry keyers 
(code 385); lowest-wage 50% of computer equipment operators (codes 308-309); middle-wage 50% of 
barbers, hairdressers, and cosmetologists (codes 457-458); highest-wage 25% of farming, forestry, and 
fishing occupations (codes 473-499) except farm operators and managers (codes 473-476) and captains and 
other officers of fishing vessels (code 497); lowest-wage 50% of precision production, craft, and repair 
occupations, excluding carpet installers, drywall installers and painters, construction and maintenance 
(codes 503-699, excluding 566, 573 and 579); highest-wage 25% of assemblers (code 785) and machine 
operators (codes 703-733, 738-779); highest-wage 25% of fabricators and hand-working occupations 
(codes 783-784 and 786-795); highest-wage 50% of selected motor vehicle operators (codes 804, 808); 
lowest-wage 50% of material-moving equipment operators (codes 843-859); lowest-wage 50% of rail 
transportation occupations (codes 823-826); highest-wage 25% of water transportation occupations (codes 
828-834); highest-wage 50% of material-moving equipment operators (codes 843-859). 
Note: Herzenberg and colleagues (1998) used CPS data. I use Census data because they go back farther in 
time. 
 
Table A-1b. Classification of occupations  
Tightly-constrained work 
Lowest-wage 75% of sales counter clerks and cashiers (codes 275-276); all telephone operators (code 348); 
all bank tellers (code 383); all data entry keyers (code 385); middle two wage-quartiles of assemblers (code 
785); middle-two wage quartiles of assemblers (code 785) and machine operators (codes 703-733, 738-
779); all production inspectors, testers, samplers, and weighers (codes 796-799); second-highest quartile of 
fabricators and hand-working occupations (codes 783-784 and 786-795); 
Unrationalized labor-intensive work 
All street and door-to-door sales workers (code 277); all news vendors (code 278); lowest-wage 50% of 
administrative support occupations (codes 303-389) except adjusters and investigators in codes 375-376, 
computer equipment operators (codes 308-309), telephone operators (code 348), bank tellers (code 383), 
and data entry keyers (code 385); all private household occupations (codes 403-407); all crossing guards 
and bridge tenders, guards, watchmen, doorkeepers, and protective services, n.e.c. (codes 425-427) and 
lowest-wage 75% of sheriffs, bailiffs, correctional institution officers (423); all service occupations (codes 
433-469) except barbers, hairdressers, and cosmetologists (codes 457-458); lowest-wage 25% of barbers, 
hairdressers, and cosmetologists (codes 457-458); lowest-wage 75% of farming, forestry, and fishing 
occupations (codes 473-499) except farm operators and managers (codes 473-476) and captains and other 
officers of fishing vessels (code 497); all masons, tilers, and carpet installers (code 563); all drywall 
installers (code 573); lowest-wage 50% of painters (code 579); lowest-wage 25% of assemblers (code 785) 
and machine operators (codes 703-733, 738-779); lowest-wage 50% of fabricators and hand-working 
occupations (codes 783-784 and 786-795); lowest-wage 50% of selected motor vehicle operators (codes 
804, 808); all taxi cab drivers and chauffeurs and parking lot attendants (codes 809, 813); all handlers, 
equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers (codes 864-889); all dental assistants (code 445). 
 
Table A-2. Revisions to the Herzenberg et al. (1998) labor process coding  
High-skill autonomous 
Include all of Executive, administrative, and managerial occupations (rather than only highest-wage 25%).  
Drop lowest-wage 50% of selected professional specialty occupations (therapists, primary and secondary 
teachers; codes 098-106, 155-163) into semiautonomous category. 
Include all airplane pilots and navigators and air traffic controllers (226-227); and only highest-wage 25% 
of selected technologist occupations (203-218, 234) (rather than highest-wage 75%). 
CPS codes distinguish Sheriffs, bailiffs, and other law enforcement officers from Correctional institution 
officers, but the IPUMS Census codes do not; thus, the highest-wage 25% of sheriffs, bailiffs, correctional 
institution officers were coded as high-skill autonomous. 
Include highest-wage 50% of selected precision production, craft, and repair occupations (rather than all).  
All inspectors, testers, samplers, and weighers moved to tightly-constrained (rather than top 25% here). 
Semiautonomous 
Include lowest 50% of codes select professional specialty occupations (codes 098-106, 155-163). 
Include lowest-wage 75% of selected technologist occupations (rather than lowest-wage 25%). 
Include highest-wage 50% (rather than 75%) of select administrative support occupations (codes 303-389). 
All dental assistants (code 445) moved to unrationalized labor intensive (rather than all here). 
Include only highest-wage 25% (rather than 50%) of machine operators (codes 703-733, 738-779). 
Include only highest-wage 25% (rather than 50%) of fabricators & hand-working occ. (783-784, 786-795).  
Taxi cab drivers and chauffeurs and parking lot attendants moved to unrationalized labor-intensive. 
Include 50% of precision production, craft, and repair occupations (rather than none). 
All inspectors, testers, samplers, and weighers moved to tightly-constrained (rather than bottom 50% here). 
All taxi cab drivers & chauffeurs & parking lot attendants (809, 813) moved to unrationalized labor-intens. 
Tightly-constrained 
Include middle-two wage quartiles of machine operators (rather than second-lowest wage quartile). 
Include second-highest quartile of fabricators and hand-working occupations. 
Include all production inspectors, testers, samplers, and weighers (rather than only second-highest quartile). 
Unrationalized labor-intensive 
Included lowest-wage 50% (rather than 25%) of select administrative support occupations (codes 303-389). 
Included lowest-wage 75% of sheriffs, bailiffs, correctional institution officers. 
Include all taxi cab drivers and chauffeurs and parking lot attendants (rather than only bottom 50% ). 
Include all dental assistants (code 445). 
Note: A text document explaining reasons for my changes can be supplied on request.  
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